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FAA V. COOPER: 
HOW THE COURT STRIPPED 
THE PRIVACY ACT OF 
ITS PURPOSE AND MEANING 
Anna Kim* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974
1
 (the “Act”) in order 
“to provide certain safeguards for an individual against an invasion 
of personal privacy” by federal agencies.
2
 To that end, the Act sets 
forth a comprehensive framework regulating federal agencies in the 
management of an individual’s confidential records.
3
 It also contains 
a civil remedies provision that allows an individual to bring civil 
lawsuits against the federal government and to recover “actual 
damages” for an agency’s violation of the Act that has had an 
adverse effect on the individual.
4
 
The term “actual damages” does not have a plain or ordinary 
meaning,
5
 and Congress did not provide a clear definition of it in the 
Act.
6
 Thus, the meaning of “actual damages,” as used in the civil 
 
 * J.D., May 2013, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., 2010, University of California, 
San Diego. I owe my gratitude to Professor Gary Williams for his invaluable guidance and 
insight; Andrew Arons, Leslie Hinshaw, Sean Degarmo, and Scott Klausner for their editorial 
judgment; and the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their diligence 
and dedication. I also owe a special thanks to my family and friends for being my continual 
source of love, joy, and encouragement. 
 1. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. § 552a (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 2. See id. § 2(b). “In 1974, Congress was concerned with curbing the illegal surveillance 
and investigation of individuals by federal agencies that had been exposed during the Watergate 
scandal.” OFFICE OF PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OVERVIEW OF THE 
PRIVACY ACT 4 (2010) [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVACY ACT], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opcl/1974privacyact.pdf, quoted in FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1462 
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 3. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 4. See id. § 552a(g)(1)(D), (g)(4)(A). 
 5. See discussion infra Part III. 
 6. See discussion infra Part III. 
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remedies provision of the Act, has been the subject of much debate, 
and lower courts had been split on the question of whether actual 
damages are limited to pecuniary losses or whether they also include 
nonpecuniary losses such as mental or emotional distress.
7
 
In March of the 2011–2012 term, however, the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided FAA v. Cooper
8
 and resolved the lower courts’ 
disagreement over the meaning of the term “actual damages” in the 
Act. In Cooper, Stanmore Cooper, a private pilot, filed suit against 
three federal agencies, claiming that they violated the Act by 
disclosing his confidential information and that their violation caused 
him mental and emotional distress.
9
 Since the Court could have 
plausibly construed the Act’s civil remedies provision to mean that 
Congress did not intend to waive the federal government’s sovereign 
immunity from liability for only nonpecuniary harm, the Court held 
that the term “actual damages,” in the context of the Privacy Act, 
refers only to economic or pecuniary losses.
10
 Cooper was thus 
unable to recover under the Act.
11
 
The Court’s ruling creates a troubling gap between the 
substantive and remedial provisions of the Act and leaves a large 
number of injured individuals without any form of meaningful relief. 
Thus, this Comment argues that the Court incorrectly determined in 
FAA v. Cooper that Congress could have intended the civil remedies 
provision of the Act to offer relief only to those individuals who have 
suffered some form of economic or pecuniary harm. Part II of the 
Comment lays out the relevant factual and procedural backgrounds, 
and Part III explains the Court’s reasoning and analysis. Part IV then 
argues that the Court (1) failed to recognize clear congressional 
intent reflected in the Act’s context, language, and purpose; and (2) 
 
 7. For example, both the Eleventh Circuit and the Sixth Circuit had interpreted “actual 
damages” under the Act to mean strictly pecuniary losses. See, e.g., Fanin v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Veterans Affairs, 572 F.3d 868, 872 (11th Cir. 2009); Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 1193, 1207 (6th 
Cir. 1997); Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 328 (11th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit and the Fifth 
Circuit, however, had adopted a more liberal interpretation of “actual damages” to include 
nonpecuniary losses as well. See, e.g., Cooper v. FAA, 622 F.3d 1016, 1035 (9th Cir. 2010), 
rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012); Johnson v. Dep’t of Treasury, IRS, 700 F.2d 971, 986 (5th Cir. 
1983). 
 8. 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012). 
 9. Id. at 1446−47. 
 10. Id. at 1456. 
 11. Id. 
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improperly relied on Doe v. Chao
12
 and the Act’s legislative history 
to find ambiguity and apply the sovereign immunity canon. Finally, 
Part V concludes by explaining the significant implications of the 
Court’s narrow reading of the term “actual damages.” It also calls 
upon Congress to legislatively overturn the Court’s holding by 
amending the Act to clearly state that violations of the Act entitle 
injured individuals to awards of monetary damages for both 
economic and noneconomic injuries. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires pilots to 
obtain a pilot certificate and a medical certificate in order to operate 
an aircraft.
13
 Because the FAA did not issue medical certificates to 
persons with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) at the time 
Cooper was diagnosed with HIV in 1985, Cooper did not apply for a 
medical certificate.
14
 
Cooper later applied for a medical certificate in 1994 without 
disclosing his HIV status or the antiretroviral medication he had been 
taking for his virus, and the FAA issued him a medical certificate.
15
 
In 1995, Cooper’s health deteriorated, and he applied for long-
term disability benefits with the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) under Title II of the Social Security Act.
16
 As part of this 
process, Cooper disclosed his HIV status to the SSA and received 
benefits from August 1995 to August 1996.
17
 
Cooper then renewed his medical certificate with the FAA in 
1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004, each time withholding information 
about his HIV status and medication.
18
 
Cooper’s intentional concealment of his medical condition was 
revealed in 2002, when the Department of Transportation (DOT) and 
the SSA launched “Operation Safe Pilot,” a joint criminal 
investigation aimed at identifying pilots who were medically unfit 
but had received FAA certifications to fly.
19
 As part of the 
 
 12. 540 U.S. 614 (2004). 
 13. 14 C.F.R. § 61.3(a), (c) (2011). 
 14. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1446. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–34 (1994). 
 17. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1446. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 1446−47. 
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investigation, the DOT provided the SSA with the names and other 
identifying information of forty-five thousand pilots who were 
licensed in Northern California.
20
 The SSA compared this 
information with the names of individuals who had received long-
term disability benefits under the Social Security Act.
21
 The SSA 
then provided the DOT with a spreadsheet of its results, which 
revealed that Cooper held a current medical certificate despite also 
having received benefits from the SSA.
22
 The FAA determined that it 
would not have issued Cooper a medical certificate if he had 
truthfully disclosed his HIV status.
23
 
Cooper admitted to the investigators that he intentionally 
concealed information about his medical condition from the FAA.
24
 
Thereafter, the FAA revoked Cooper’s pilot certificate for fraudulent 
omissions, and a grand jury indicted him “on three counts of making 
false statements to a Government agency, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001.”
25
 Cooper “pleaded guilty to one count of making and 
delivering a false official writing,” and he received two years of 
probation and a fine of $1,000.
26
 
Cooper then filed suit against the FAA, DOT, and SSA 
(collectively the “Government”) in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California.
27
 He claimed that the Government 
violated the Act by sharing his confidential information
28
 and alleged 
that the unlawful disclosure “caused him ‘humiliation, 
embarrassment, mental anguish, fear of social ostracism, and other 
severe emotional distress.’”
29
 Cooper did not allege pecuniary or 
economic losses.
30
 
 
 20. Id. at 1446. 
 21. Id. at 1446–47. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 1447. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) prohibits agencies from “disclos[ing] any record which is 
contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another 
agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the 
individual to whom the record pertains . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2006). 
 29. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1447 (quoting Appendix to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 
120a, Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (No. 10-1024)). 
 30. Id. 
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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Government.
31
 It determined that, while the Government violated the 
Act and there was a triable issue as to whether its violation was 
intentional or willful,
32
 Cooper was not entitled to recover any 
damages because he failed to allege any pecuniary or economic 
losses.
33
 Relying on various decisions in which the Ninth Circuit 
held that “actual damages” meant “economic loss” in some contexts 
and “emotional distress and humiliation” in others,
34
 the district court 
determined that “the term ‘actual damages’ is facially ambiguous.”
35
 
The court then applied the sovereign immunity canon,
36
 construed 
the term in favor of the Government, and held that “mental distress 
alone does not satisfy the Privacy Act’s actual damages 
requirement.”
37
 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed and remanded.
38
 Recognizing that the term “actual 
damages” is in fact ambiguous, the court applied traditional tools of 
 
 31. Cooper v. FAA, 816 F. Supp. 2d 778, 781 (N.D. Cal. 2008), rev’d, 622 F.3d 1016 (9th 
Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012). 
 32. See id. at 790. 
With certain exceptions, it is unlawful for an agency to disclose a record to another 
agency without the written consent of the person to whom the record pertains. One 
exception to this nondisclosure requirement applies when the head of an agency makes 
a written request for law enforcement purposes to the agency that maintains the record. 
The agencies in this case could easily have shared [Cooper’s] medical records pursuant 
to the procedures prescribed by the Privacy Act, but the District Court concluded that 
they failed to do so. 
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1447 n.2 (citations omitted) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), (b)(7)). 
 33. See Cooper, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 792. 
 34. Id. at 791. In Ryan v. Foster & Marshall, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that, for purposes 
of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a), “actual damages” requires “some form of 
economic loss.” 556 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1977). In Mackie v. Rieser, the Ninth Circuit again 
held that, in the context of copyright infringement, “actual damages” must include some form of 
“objective[ly]” measurable financial loss. 296 F.3d 909, 917 (9th Cir. 2002). For violations of the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, however, the Ninth Circuit held that emotional 
distress and humiliation alone can constitute “actual damages.” Guimond v. Trans Union Credit 
Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 35. Cooper, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 791. 
 36. See id. at 792. Under the sovereign immunity canon, “a waiver of [the federal 
government’s] sovereign immunity must be ‘unequivocally expressed’ in statutory text.” Cooper, 
132 S. Ct. at 1448 (citing Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)). “Any ambiguities in the 
statutory language are to be construed in favor of immunity, so that the Government’s consent to 
be sued is never enlarged beyond what a fair reading of the text requires.” Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 
1448 (citations omitted). 
 37. Cooper, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 792. 
 38. Cooper v. FAA, 622 F.3d 1016, 1035 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012). 
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statutory interpretation
39
 and concluded that “Congress clearly 
intended that when a federal agency intentionally or willfully fails to 
uphold its record-keeping obligations under the [Privacy] Act, and 
that failure proximately causes an adverse effect on the plaintiff, the 
plaintiff is entitled to recover for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary 
injuries.”
40
 The court reasoned that to hold otherwise “would be an 
unreasonable construction of the Act.”
41
 
The Government petitioned for panel rehearing and rehearing en 
banc, but the Ninth Circuit denied the petitions.
42
 The Government 
then petitioned the Supreme Court for review, and the Court granted 
certiorari.
43
 
III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
The issue before the Court was whether the Privacy Act waived 
the Government’s sovereign immunity from liability for 
nonpecuniary harms such as mental or emotional distress.
44
 This 
required the Court to determine whether Congress unequivocally 
intended the term “actual damages,” as used in the Act’s civil-
remedies provision, to include damages for mental or emotional 
distress.
45
 In a 5−3 decision,
46
 the Court held that Congress did not 
unequivocally authorize damages for nonpecuniary harms and that, 
therefore, the Act did not waive the Government’s sovereign 
immunity from liability for Cooper’s strictly nonpecuniary losses.
47
 
The subject remedial provision of the Act allows an individual 
to bring a civil action against a federal agency that “fails to comply 
with [the provisions of the Act] . . . in such a way as to have an 
adverse effect on [the] individual.”
48
 If the agency’s violation is 
found to be “intentional or willful,” the United States is liable for 
 
 39. See id. at 1028−29, 1035. The court looked to “intrinsic sources”—the plain meaning of 
the statute—and, upon determining that there is no plain meaning to “actual damages,” looked to 
“extrinsic sources,” such as the Act’s legislative history and the use of the term “actual damages” 
in other statutes. Id. at 1028−33. 
 40. Id. at 1035. 
 41. Id. at 1030. 
 42. See id. at 1019. 
 43. FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (2012). 
 44. See id. at 1446, 1448. 
 45. Id. at 1448. 
 46. Id. at 1445. Justice Kagan did not participate in the decision. Id. at 1456. 
 47. Id. at 1456. 
 48. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D) (2006). 
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“actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal 
or failure [to comply], but in no case shall a person entitled to 
recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000.”
49
 
Writing for the majority in Cooper, Justice Alito stated that 
“‘actual damages’ is a legal term of art”
50
 and that “[e]ven as a legal 
term, . . . the meaning of ‘actual damages’ is far from clear.”
51
 The 
Court also pointed to the term’s “chameleon-like quality”
52
 and then 
applied other tools of statutory construction to examine the meaning 
of the term within the specific context of the Act.
53
 
The Court first stated the purpose of the Act: “[T]o establish 
safeguards to protect individuals against the disclosure of 
confidential records ‘which could result in substantial harm, 
embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any individual on 
whom information is maintained.’”
54
 The Court then noted that “the 
Act serves interests similar to those protected by defamation and 
privacy torts”
55
 and that it previously has recognized in Doe v. Chao 
that the Act’s remedial provision “‘parallels’ the remedial scheme for 
the common-law torts of libel per quod and slander.”
56
 Based on the 
parallels previously drawn, the Court relied heavily on defamation 
and privacy torts to infer a plausible congressional intent of the 
Act.
57
 
 
 49. Id. § 552a(g)(4)(A). 
 50. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1449 (citing Cooper v. FAA, 622 F.3d 1016, 1028 (9th Cir. 2010), 
rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012)). 
 51. Id. The Court cited to the definition of “actual damages” provided in the Black’s Law 
Dictionary available at the time of the enactment of the Act and concluded that it was of minimal 
guidance. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 467 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)). 
 52. Id. at 1450. The Court provided examples of how the term “actual damages” has been 
interpreted differently in different statutes. For example, it has been interpreted to encompass 
nonpecuniary damages in the Fair Housing Act and the Fair Credit Reporting Act but has been 
limited to only pecuniary damages in the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Copyright Act of 1901. 
Id. at 1449. 
 53. See id. at 1450−53. Unlike the district court, which automatically resorted to the 
sovereign immunity canon after determining that the term is ambiguous in the statute, Cooper v. 
FAA, 816 F. Supp. 2d 778, 792 (N.D. Cal. 2008), rev’d, 622 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 
S. Ct. 1441 (2012), the Supreme Court recognized that the sovereign immunity canon is merely 
one “tool for interpreting the law” and that it does not “displac[e] the other traditional tools of 
statutory construction.” Id. at 1448 (alteration in original) (quoting Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. 
Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 589 (2008)). 
 54. See id. at 1450 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1451 (citing Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 625 (2004)). 
 57. See id. at 1450−53. 
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Under the common law torts of libel per quod and slander, 
plaintiffs are entitled to recover “general damages” so long as they 
first prove “special damages.”
58
 General damages “cover ‘loss of 
reputation, shame, mortification, injury to the feelings and the like 
and need not be alleged in detail and require no proof.’”
59
 Special 
damages, on the other hand, include only proven pecuniary loss.
60
 
The Court reasoned that the parallels between the Act and the torts of 
libel per quod and slander suggest that “Congress [likely] intended 
‘actual damages’ in the Privacy Act to mean special damages . . . .”
61
 
Thus, the Court held that an individual must first demonstrate that he 
or she suffered some pecuniary or economic loss—“no matter how 
slight”—in order to recover the statutory minimum of $1,000 under 
the Act.
62
 
The majority further supported this determination with the Act’s 
legislative history.
63
 It cited to an uncodified section of the Act in 
which the Privacy Protection Study Commission (PPSC), established 
by Congress to consider “whether the Federal Government should be 
liable for general damages,” recommended that Congress allow 
recovery for general damages.
64
 Because Congress never amended 
the Act to authorize “general damages,” despite the PPSC’s 
recommendation, the Court reasoned that “Congress [likely] intended 
‘actual damages’ in the Privacy Act to mean special damages . . . .”
65
 
For these reasons, the Court held that “it is plausible to read the 
statute . . . to authorize only damages for economic loss”
66
 and that 
Congress did not unequivocally waive sovereign immunity from 
 
 58. Id. at 1451 (citing Chao, 540 U.S. at 625). 
 59. Id. at 1451 & n.7 (quoting 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY & D. AVERY HAGGARD, TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT § 164, at 
579 (4th ed. 1932) [hereinafter COOLEY & HAGGARD]). 
 60. Id. at 1451 & n.6 (citing COOLEY & HAGGARD, supra note 59, § 164, at 580). 
 61. See id. at 1451. 
 62. See id. The Court also noted that it is insignificant that Congress used the term “actual 
damages” instead of “special damages” since Congress has often used those terms 
interchangeably. See id. at 1451–52. 
 63. See id. at 1452−53. 
 64. Id. at 1452 (emphasis added) (citing Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 
§ 5(c)(2)(B)(iii), 88 Stat. 1896, 1907 (1974)). 
 65. Id. The majority also added that the fact that PPSC later “understood ‘actual damages’ in 
the Act to be ‘a synonym for special damages’” further supports its holding. Id. at 1452−53 
(quoting U.S. PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION 
SOCIETY: THE REPORT OF THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION 530 (1977)). 
 66. See id. at 1453 (citing United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34, 37 (1992)). 
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liability for nonpecuniary damages.
67
 Thus, the Court applied the 
sovereign immunity canon and declined to “expand the scope of 
Congress’s sovereign immunity waiver beyond what the statutory 
text clearly requires.”
68
 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE COOPER COURT’S REASONING 
The Supreme Court erred in Cooper by (1) failing to recognize 
the clear congressional expression of waiver of sovereign immunity; 
and (2) improperly relying on Doe v. Chao and the legislative history 
of the Act. 
A.  The Cooper Court Failed to Find 
a Clear Congressional Expression of Waiver 
First, Congress articulated in the Congressional Findings and 
Statement of Purpose attached to the Privacy Act that 
[t]he purpose of this Act is to provide certain safeguards for 
an individual against an invasion of personal privacy by 
requiring Federal agencies . . . to . . . be subject to civil suit 
for any damages which occur as a result of willful or 
intentional action which violates any individual’s right 
under this Act.
69
 
By stating that the Act is intended to subject the government to civil 
suit for any damages that result from the government’s violation of 
the Act, Congress clearly expressed its intent, not to distinguish 
between types of damages, but to provide relief for all types of 
damages—pecuniary or nonpecuniary—that result from the 
government’s violations. 
The text of the Act itself also supports this congressional 
purpose and intent,
70
 as pointed out by the Ninth Circuit and Justice 
Sotomayor in her dissent.
71
 The text of § 552a(e)(10) of the Act 
requires federal agencies to “establish appropriate . . . safeguards to 
insure the security and confidentiality of records and to protect 
 
 67. Id. (citing Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(b), (b)(6), 88 Stat. 1896, 1896 (emphasis 
added). 
 70. See Frederick Z. Lodge, Damages Under the Privacy Act of 1974: Compensation and 
Deterrence, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 621 (1984). 
 71. Cooper v. FAA, 622 F.3d 1016, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012); 
FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1458–59 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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against any anticipated threats or hazards to their security or integrity 
which could result in substantial harm, embarrassment, 
inconvenience, or unfairness to any individual on whom information 
is maintained.”
72
 Similarly, § 552a(g)(1)(C) offers civil remedies if 
an agency “fails to maintain any record concerning any 
individual . . . as is necessary to assure fairness in any determination 
relating to the . . . character . . . of . . . the individual that may be 
made on the basis of such record.”
73
 As some have noted, the 
interests protected by these provisions appear largely to be “dignitary 
interests that can only be measured in terms of mental or physical 
injury.”
74
 As such, there is good reason to conclude that Congress 
intended to provide relief for injuries to such interests by authorizing 
monetary awards for nonpecuniary damages. 
Surely, that Congress sought to protect these dignitary interests 
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Congress also sought 
to remedy the injuries to such interests by waiving immunity for 
nonpecuniary damages. Justice Alito alluded to this point in Cooper 
by noting that even if the Act does not authorize damages for 
nonpecuniary harms, it provides other remedies, such as criminal 
sanctions and injunctive relief, for the government’s violations.
75
 
However, the provisions that impose criminal sanctions are “solely 
penal and create no private right of action.”
76
 And injunctive relief, 
which is available only to allow individuals to amend upon request 
any records on them kept by the Government or to at least have such 
requests reviewed properly, does not award the injured individual 
any monetary damages.
77
 Therefore, despite the availability of these 
alternate remedies under the Act, one must recognize that these do 
not compensate the injured individual and are, therefore, not 
particularly effective in providing direct, meaningful relief. 
The common law tort of invasion of privacy, on the other hand, 
offers a more direct and tangible remedy. In consideration of the 
 
 72. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 73. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(C) (emphasis added). 
 74. Lodge, supra note 70, at 621. “[T]hough economic or physical loss may be associated 
with the [dignitary] injury, the primary or usual concern is not economic at all, but vindication of 
an intangible right.” Id. at 621 n.65 (quoting 2 DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
REMEDIES § 7.1, at 509 (1973)). 
 75. See Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1455 n.12 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i)). 
 76. OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVACY ACT, supra note 2, at 209−10; see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i). 
 77. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(A)–(B); see OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVACY ACT, supra note 2, at 
135. 
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nature of the harm that generally results from privacy invasions,
78
 the 
tort entitles an injured individual to recover damages for “harm to his 
[or her] interest in privacy” and “mental distress proved to have been 
suffered if it is of a kind that normally results from such an 
invasion.”
79
 The tort also extends recovery to other nonpecuniary 
damages such as emotional distress and personal humiliation.
80
 And 
because the common law privacy tort and the Act—the violations of 
which lead to the same type of harm—seek to protect the same 
interests,
81
 certainly Congress was aware of these common law 
remedies when drafting the Act’s remedial provision. Therefore, 
Congress very likely intended to incorporate these common law 
remedies into the Act in order to create a more effective and 
meaningful remedy for violations arising under the Act.
82
 
The inference that Congress intended to incorporate the 
principles of the common law privacy tort is further established upon 
an examination of the text of the Act’s civil remedies provision. 
Section 552a(g)(1)(D) authorizes an individual to bring an action 
against the government for violating the Act if the individual can 
show that he or she has suffered an “adverse effect” as a result.
83
 
Subsection (g)(4)(A) then allows recovery of a monetary award so 
long as the government’s violation is found to have been intentional 
 
 78. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 384 n.9 (1967) (noting that the primary damage in 
right-of-privacy cases is mental distress); 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 7.1(1), at 259 
(2d ed. 1993) (noting that an invasion of privacy often results only in an “affront to the plaintiff’s 
dignity,” “damage to his self-image,” and mental distress); Lodge, supra note 70, at 621−22 
(noting that “the type of damages most likely to occur” from violations of privacy rights is 
nonpecuniary). 
 79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H (1977). 
 80. Id. § 652H, cmt. b. Other privacy statutes similarly provide monetary damages for 
nonpecuniary harms. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for Electronic Privacy Information Center 
(EPIC) in Support of Respondent at 6–11, Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (No. 10-1024) for a list of 
federal privacy statutes that recognize damages for mental and emotional distress. 
 81. See supra notes 55−56, 69−74 and accompanying text. 
 82. In Johnson v. Department of Treasury, IRS, the Fifth Circuit actually stated in a footnote 
that “Congress did indeed borrow from the common law tort . . . .” 700 F.2d 971, 977 n.10 (5th 
Cir. 1983), abrogated on other grounds by Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004). The court pointed 
to a statement made by Senator Edmund Muskie during the congressional hearings: The Privacy 
Act “draws upon the constitutional and judicial recognition accorded to the right of privacy and 
translates it into a system of procedural and substantive safeguards against obtrusive Government 
information gathering practices.” Id. (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 36,897 (1974), reprinted in 
SUBCOMM. ON GOV’T INFO. & INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, JOINT COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 94TH 
CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, at 311 (1976) [hereinafter 
SOURCEBOOK]). 
 83. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D) (2006). 
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or willful.
84
 Because courts generally have accepted that mental or 
emotional distress constitutes an “adverse effect” under the Act,
85
 it 
is unreasonable “[t]o recognize that the Act entitles one to actual 
damages for an adverse effect related to one’s mental or emotional 
well-being, or one’s character, . . . while holding that one injured 
under the Act cannot recover actual damages for nonpecuniary 
injuries . . . .”
86
 
Thus, an examination of the Act’s text, purpose, and overall 
context subjects the term “actual damages” to only one plausible 
interpretation and leads to the conclusion that Congress 
unequivocally intended to waive sovereign immunity from liabilities 
for nonpecuniary damages. Interpreting the term otherwise, as the 
Cooper Court did,
87
 creates discrepancies between the Act’s purpose 
and effect as well as in its substantive and remedial provisions. 
B.  The Cooper Court Improperly Relied 
on Doe v. Chao and Legislative History 
To nonetheless reject a finding of clear congressional intent, the 
Cooper Court relied heavily on Doe v. Chao and the legislative 
history of the Act.
88
 The Cooper Court concluded that the exclusion 
of the terms “special damages” and “general damages” from the Act, 
despite the parallels drawn between the Act and common law 
defamation torts, suggests that Congress could have intended “actual 
damages” to mean pecuniary damages.
89
 The Court’s conclusion, 
however, is unwarranted for three reasons. 
First, nothing in the remedial scheme or purpose of the Act 
suggests that “actual damages” and “special damages” are 
synonymous terms. In defining “special damages” as proven 
pecuniary damages, the Chao Court expressly declined to hold that 
“actual damages,” too, are limited to pecuniary losses.
90
 Indeed, that 
Congress chose to use the term “actual damages” instead of “special 
 
 84. Id. § 552a(g)(4). 
 85. See Cooper v. FAA, 622 F.3d 1016, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012) 
(citations omitted) (noting that in addition to the Ninth Circuit, “at least seven other [circuit 
courts] have recognized that a nonpecuniary harm, such as emotional distress, may constitute an 
adverse effect under the Act”). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See supra notes 66−68 and accompanying text. 
 88. See discussion supra Part III. 
 89. See discussion supra Part III. 
 90. See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 622 n.5 (2004). 
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damages” despite the parallels makes it more likely that Congress did 
not intend to limit recovery to pecuniary damages. 
Second, there is nothing to suggest that “actual damages” and 
“general damages” are synonymous terms, either. As the Cooper 
Court explained, general damages “cover ‘loss of reputation, shame, 
mortification, injury to the feelings and the like and need not be 
alleged in detail and require no proof.’”
91
 This does not mean that 
general damages are equivalent to or limited to nonpecuniary 
damages; rather, it indicates only that general damages can include 
nonpecuniary damages that are not proven. In fact, the Chao Court 
stated that in the context of privacy and defamation torts, “general 
damages” mean presumed damages, and they are “calculated without 
reference to any specific harm.”
92
 Therefore, as the Chao Court held, 
“[t]he deletion of ‘general damages’ from the [Privacy Act] is fairly 
seen . . . as a deliberate elimination of any possibility of . . . awarding 
presumed damages,”
93
 not as an elimination of awarding 
nonpecuniary damages. 
Third, the discussion of general damages in the Act’s legislative 
history further undermines the Cooper Court’s reliance on legislative 
history. Prior to the enactment of the Act, the original House bill 
advocated a higher standard for holding the government liable. The 
House bill provided for “actual damages resulting from the willful, 
arbitrary, or capricious action of an agency.”
94
 The original Senate 
bill, on the other hand, was more generous to the injured individual 
and provided for “any actual damages sustained” as well as “punitive 
damages where appropriate.”
95
 Then, the Senate bill, as passed in 
November 1974, also provided for “general damages.”
96
 This was 
the only portion of the legislative history—other than the PPSC’s 
 
 91. FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1451 (2012) (quoting COOLEY & HAGGARD, supra 
note 59, § 164, at 579). 
 92. Chao, 540 U.S. at 621. 
 93. Id. at 623 (emphasis added). Prior Supreme Court cases also distinguish between 
presumed and proven damages in the context of defamation torts, as opposed to distinguishing 
between pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262–64 
(1978); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349–50 (1974). 
 94. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, at 18 (1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 82, at 311. 
 95. S. 3418, 93d Cong. § 304(b)(1), (b)(2) (as introduced by Senator Sam Ervin, May 1, 
1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 82, at 27. 
 96. S. 3418, 93d Cong. § 303(c)(1) (as passed by the Senate, Nov. 21, 1974), reprinted in 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 82, at 371. 
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recommendation—mentioning the term “general damages.”
97
 
Ultimately, the final version of the Act reflected a compromise 
between the more government-friendly House bill and the more 
citizen-friendly Senate bill. The Act dropped the Senate bill’s 
proposal to grant punitive damages and general damages and 
lowered the House’s proposed standard of recovery to just “willful or 
intentional” governmental action.
98
 
This compromise, particularly the exclusion of “general 
damages,” again provides little insight into whether Congress 
intended to eliminate monetary awards for nonpecuniary harms. 
Congress’s rejection of PPSC’s recommendation to allow recovery 
for general damages similarly has little, if any, bearing on that 
question. Accordingly, the exclusion of general damages from the 
Act does not, as the Cooper Court stated, “ma[ke] clear that 
[Congress] viewed [general damages and nonpecuniary damages] as 
mutually exclusive.”
99
 Rather, it indicates, at best, that Congress 
likely intended to eliminate any recovery for presumed damages—
“without reference to any specific harm.”
100
 
Therefore, the Cooper Court’s conclusion that it is plausible to 
interpret the remedial provision as encompassing only pecuniary 
damages lacks support. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Cooper Court could have arrived at a clear answer to its 
question by using the traditional tools of statutory construction, and 
 
 97. A keyword search of the term “general damages” in the Privacy Act’s legislative history, 
as compiled in the “Sourcebook” and reported in Westlaw, revealed that the term was used nine 
times in the legislative history. The term appears on page 371 of the Sourcebook as part of the 
Senate Bill that was passed in November 1974 and again on page 433 as part of the House Bill, as 
passed by the Senate. The term also appears in proposals for additional privacy legislation by 
Senator Sam Ervin and Representative Bella Abzug, dated before the final Senate and House bills 
were passed. S. 2963, 93d Cong. § 308(e) (as introduced by Senator Ervin, Feb. 5, 1974), 
reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 82, at 647; H.R. 13872, 93d Cong. § 552a(g)(1) (as 
introduced by Representative Abzug, Apr.  2, 1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 82, at 
733. Additionally, the term appears in four other places in the history, but is mentioned only in 
connection to the PPSC’s role in determining whether general damages should be provided. See 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 82, at 488, 855, 859, 987. Finally, the term appears in the summary of 
the amendments to S. 3418. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 82, at 768. 
 98. See Todd Robert Coles, Does the Privacy Act of 1974 Protect Your Right to Privacy? An 
Examination of the Routine Use Exemption, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 957, 974 (1991). 
 99. FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1452 (2012). 
 100. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 621−23 (2004). 
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so it did not need to “seek refuge in a canon of construction”
101
—
namely, the sovereign immunity canon. But this is precisely what the 
Court did. As a result, it adopted an overly restrictive and literal 
interpretation of the term “actual damages” in the Act’s civil 
remedies provision. The Court required an unnecessarily explicit 
articulation of congressional intent of waiver when proper 
application of the traditional modes of statutory interpretation 
already pointed to only one plausible interpretation of “actual 
damages.”
102
 This insistence, however, unnecessarily burdens 
Congress with the need to intervene and amend legislation when it 
has already expressed its intent clearly.
103
 And as Justice Stevens 
stated in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Nordic Village,
104
 
“the interest in requiring the Congress to draft its legislation with 
greater clarity or precision does not justify a refusal to make a good-
faith effort to ascertain the actual meaning of the message it tried to 
convey in a statutory provision that is already on the books.”
105
 
More importantly, the Cooper Court has created a significant 
barrier for the large majority of individuals who will seek relief 
under the Act. Despite the substantive duties and restraints that the 
Act imposes upon federal agencies, the Court’s holding reduces the 
government’s incentives to comply with the Act. And it also reduces 
the incentives for injured individuals to bring civil actions against the 
 
 101. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1456 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. 
Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 589−90 (2008)). 
 102. In doing so, the Court undermined Congress’s purpose and refused to give effect to it. 
See Bradford C. Mank, Textualism’s Selective Canons of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating 
Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 KY. L.J. 527, 
564–65 (1998) (noting that an interpretation of statutory text that is too rigorous actually presents 
the danger of “undermin[ing] Congress’ purpose in enacting a statute”). 
 103. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 45 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); see also John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2009−20, 2019 (2006) (quoting W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 
83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1974) (“[W]e do the country a disservice when we needlessly ignore 
persuasive evidence of Congress’ actual purpose and require it ‘to take the time to revisit the 
matter and to restate its purpose in more precise English . . . .’”); John Paul Stevens, Is Justice 
Irrelevant?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1121, 1128 (1993) (arguing against a strict application of the 
sovereign immunity canon because it is a “judge-made rule of strict construction of waivers of 
sovereign immunity” and refusing to look at contrary legislative history because it is just “another 
piece of judicially-crafted armor plate”). 
 104. 503 U.S. 30 (1992). 
 105. Id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
  
754 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:739 
government.
106
 Thus, there is now a “disconnect between the Act’s 
substantive and remedial provisions,”
107
 rendering the Act 
“[t]oothless.”
108
 This gap will become even more troubling as 
technological advances improve the government’s ability to collect 
and disseminate large quantities of data and, consequently, to invade 
privacy interests.
109
 
Therefore, Congress should override the Cooper Court’s 
decision by amending the text of the Act’s civil remedies provision 
(§ 552a(g)(1)(C)) to include language explicitly specifying, like they 
do with the common law tort of invasion of privacy, that “actual 
damages” include nonpecuniary harms, such as mental or emotional 
distress, and that monetary awards are allowed for those harms. Only 
by satisfying the “Court’s . . . insistence on ‘clear statements’” will 
Congress be able to restore meaning and force to its protective intent 
behind the Privacy Act.
110
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